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The Middle Way in Clear Words
William J. H. Collins
Offered with gratitude and respect to the memory of the Masters 
Nagarjuna and Chandrakirti who composed the verses and commentary 
of the Prasannapada Madhyamakavrtti.
Shall I say it again? In order to arrive there,
To arrive where you are, to get from where you are not,
You must go by a way wherein there is no ecstasy.
In order to arrive at what you do not know
You must go by a way which is the way of ignorance.
In order to possess what you do not possess
You must go by the way of dispossession.
In order to arrive at what you are not
You must go through the way in which you are not.
And what you do not know is the only thing you know
And what you own is what you do not own
And where you are is where you are not.
T. S. Eliot, East Coker
The method of critical analysis has always been central to Buddhism and its 
basic doctrines of Anatman and Pratitya Samutpada are the outcome of this. 
The Buddha analysed a living being into its component elements. Thus existence 
was analysed into five groups of the sensuous (rupa)y consciousness Qpijnana)^ 
discrimination Qamjna)^ feeling {yedana), and volition Qamskdra). It was 
analysed as a whole, i. e. consciousness with all of that which it is aware. The 
result was that a permanent entity (atman) could not be found. The component 
elements went to form only a nominal entity subject to perpetual change, but 
the finding of only impermanent phenomena is not the same as denying an 
unconditional ultimate reality which the Buddha actually affirmed. An existence 
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was thus regarded as a continuously flowing stream of discrete moments made 
up of elements of the five groups. There was no underlying substance to these 
moments. This conception has been likened to a cine film. It contained nothing 
permanent or substantial. The momentary elements were conceived as obeying 
causal laws. But this conception was adapted to the character of elements which 
could neither change nor move but only appear and disappear. Causation was 
called dependently co-ordinated origination Qtratitya samutpada) or dependent 
existence. Causality was thus assumed to exist between moments only, the 
arising of every moment being coordinated with the momentary existence of 
a number of other moments. “If there is this, there appears that.”
Buddhism denies substance and all that it implies. Existence is momentary, 
unique, discrete, with no abiding entity. Substance and what is universal and 
identical are rejected as illusory, due to wrong view Qividya). Admittedly con­
siderable difficulty was encountered in fitting in this theory with the doctrine 
of Karma and rebirth. This may be regarded as a modal view of reality. This is 
one of the two main currents of Indian philosophy. The other is the substance 
view of the Brahmanical tradition, having its origin in theatman doctrine of the 
Upanisads. Here reality is conceived on the pattern of an inner core or substrate, 
identical or immutable though surrounded by impermanence and change. In the 
Advaita Vedanta, its most radical form, the reality of appearance, change and 
plurality is held to be false. The Samkhya and the Nyaya also uphold a substantial 
rather than a modal view. Taking substance as real makes for unity and integra­
tion of experience. It also makes perception, memory and personal identity easier 
but change more difficult to explain. Suffering and bondage are due to the 
wrong identification of the atman with anatman-.
Identifying the self with this non-self—this is the bondage of man, 
which is due to his ignorance, and brings in its train the miseries of 
birth and death. It is through this that he considers the evanescent 
body as real, and identifying himself with it, nourishes, bathes and 
preserves it by means of agreeable sense objects by which he becomes 
bound as the caterpillar by the threads of its cocoon.
(Sankara, Vivekachudamani 137)
The fully developed abhidharma metaphysic is a consistent and comprehensive 
system based on the modal or anatma standpoint. If the problem for the 
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systems based on the substantial or dtma position is how to account for change, 
difference and plurality, here it is to account for the appearance of permanence, 
identity and universality. To account for apparent difference in one case and 
identity in the other, both make use of the agencies of avidya and mdyd^ the 
veiling and projecting powers of wrong view.
Thus two consistent and logical systems of metaphysics have been built on 
the opposing concepts dtman and anatman. After more or less argument and 
debate, an acute and objective mind must have come to the conclusion that the 
fault did not lie with this or that system, but that the inherent contradiction was 
due to Reason attempting to describe the unconditional in terms of the empirical. 
Such an antinomial conflict results when speculative metaphysics attempts to 
extend the forms of thought beyond their proper field.
The realization of this insoluble contradiction between the two standpoints 
led to the emergence of the Madhyamika dialectic. The systems of the atma tradi­
tion represent the thesis and the Abhidharmika system the antithesis of the 
dialectic. This is a form of the same conflict as an attempt to answer Vac- 
chagotta’s questions on ultimate things to the Buddha would have elicited. It 
was left to Nagarjuna to develop the Madhyamika to its full extent. Reason in­
volves itself in deep and insoluble conflict when it tries to go beyond phenomena 
to seek their ultimate ground. Any fact of experience when analysed reveals the 
gaping flaws in its seeming homogeneity. It loses every meaning except in rela­
tion to other entities, but these in turn depend on others and so on ad infinitum. 
Everyday commonsense declines to pursue this as irrelevance. Philosophical 
systems owing to their attachment to a particular view are blind to these flaws. 
Those who maintain the world has a real existence are wrong, because on deep 
penetration, the world with all its manifold phenomena is found to be essentially 
relative and therefore ultimately unreal. And those who advocate non-existence 
or nonbeing are also wrong because they are denying even the phenomenal 
reality of the world. Eternalism and Nihilism are both false. Intellect gives us 
four categories—existence, non-existence, both and neither and involves itself 
in sixty-two antinomies.1 It cannot give us Reality. Reality transcends all the 
categories and at the same time transcends all the antinomies. But it has to be 
directly realized through spiritual experience. In it the subject-object duality 
which is the basic cause of suffering is transcended.
1 See Brahmajala sutta.
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Before the mighty strokes of Nagarjuna’s destructive dialectic which was later 
continued by his able commentator Chandrakirti, the entire structure of the 
phenomenal world collapses like a house of cards when the phenomena are held to 
be real in themselves. However considered as phenomena from the empirical 
standpoint making up our everyday world they are real enough. Such phenomena 
are the individual subject and external objects, space and time, matter, motion 
and causality, also the Four Noble Truths, God, Nirvana and the Buddha.
Nagarjuna and Chandrakirti did not attempt to sustain a point of view—or 
build a system of philosophy—except it might be said the negation of all views. 
They concentrated on showing up the inconsistencies and contradictions in the 
views and philosophical systems of others.
Because of the central position of pratitya samutpada in Buddhist thought it 
is not surprising that the Madhyamika or Sunyavada school should devote 
particular attention to causality. Pratitya samutpada is interpreted as sunyata.
The Buddhist, Brahmanical, Samkhya and Jaina systems all agree that the 
principle of causality governs all phenomena. Before the advent of the Madhya­
mika or Sunyavada, it was taken as ultimately real. Thus the problem of the 
Madhyamika was to show that causality and other categories were of empirical 
value only. They are a convenient description for the texture of phenomena. 
This conclusion Sunyavada establishes by showing that all the possible ways 
in which causality and the categories can be understood under the terms of iden­
tity, difference or both or neither, are riddled with contradiction. It is obviously 
necessary to differentiate between cause and effect, and yet at the same time to 
identify them. Thus their relation cannot be conceived as identity, difference or 
both, nor is it no relation.
Four alternative views are usually considered regarding causality. The effect 
may be considered as the self-expression of the cause, or caused by factors other 
than itself, or both, or neither. The last alternative amounts to a denial of 
causation, as it means that things are produced at random. The third alternative 
is really a compound of the first two. This leaves the first two as the principal 
alternatives to be considered. Self-production, or the identity of cause and effect 
Qatkaryavada^ is the Samkhya view of causation. Buddhism holds the opposite 
view that they are different (asatkaryavada). Dialectical criticism discloses the 
inherent flaw in each conception.
Self-production or the identity of cause and effect will first be considered.
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A thing cannot arise out of itself. If the effect is already existent in its cause, it 
is already an existing fact requiring no further production; if the effect does 
not exist in its cause nothing can produce it. Nobody says the son of a barren 
woman was a king. But the entity produced must be different from its cause. 
If cause and effect were identical, how is one to function as cause and the other 
as effect? If it is supposed that initially the cause was potential and then it 
becomes actual, a change of states rather than substances taking place, the 
question then becomes what brings about this change of state? This question 
is very pertinent with regard to the primeval matter (prakrti) of the Samkhya. 
What causes it to pass from the state of pure potentiality to manifestation, if 
not the self Qturusa^ which however is held to be radically separate from the 
primeval matter?
Turning now to causality in the Abhidharma which is based on the view of 
asatkaryavada (production from another—non-identity of cause and effect), four 
kinds of causes or conditions Qratyayas) are usually enumerated in Abhidharma 
treatises. The Abhidharma of the Sarvastivadins which was in particular criticised 
by Nagarjuna will be considered here. The four causes or conditions are hetu, 
alambana, samanantara and adhipati. They do not bear much resemblance to the 
Aristotelian fourfold division of causes. The hetu is the direct cause correspond­
ing in some respects to the material cause. It is defined as that which directly 
brings about the result, for example, the seed producing a sprout. Alambana is 
the object-condition which is taken as the cause in the production of knowledge 
and mentals (Atta and caitta(). All samskrta and asamskrta dharmas can act as 
alambana pratyaya. The samanantara is the immediately preceding moment of 
cessation of the cause before the arising of the effect. The adhipati pratyaya is 
the indirect influence which one dharma has over another. It is not merely 
the dominant condition but the comprehensive and universal cause. Any entity 
or dharma exerts an influence over all other entities except itself. The adhipati 
pratyaya is thus wider in scope than all the pratyayas, including the alambana 
which conditions only mental phenomena. It is a co-present cause. No single 
entity is held to be the cause of an effect. This is criticized by the Madhyamika 
in addition to the fact of the cause being different from the effect. God, prakrti, 
time and chance are not held to be causes.
A cause is so named because an effect depends on it. But as long as the effect 
is absent it cannot be held to be a cause. On the other hand, the cause cannot 
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have anything present as effect, as a cause of an already present effect would be 
purposeless. If entities are interdependent and relative as are cause and effect 
they have no self-existence and they cannot exist as separate entities. What lacks 
self-existence cannot be cause and a non-existent thing cannot disappear being 
already a nonentity. Thus an effect can neither have cause or be without them 
and conversely causes neither produce an effect or are without an effect. Since 
the Abhidharma assumes non-identity of cause and effect, regarding hetu it may 
be said owing to lack of relation between the two, in principle anything might 
be produced from anything; a pebble might sprout into a plant, otherness to the 
plant being present in the pebble as well as the seed. As to dlambana as object 
condition for mental dharmas, the latter are considered entities separate from 
their objective support or counterpart. If the mental dharma is already present, 
the object support is superfluous; if the mental dharma is absent there can be 
no relationship between the two. The samanantara as the cessation of cause im­
mediately precedent to the effect, cannot produce an effect because it cannot 
disappear owing to its inherent lack of self-existence. The adhipati as the general 
influence of all entities may be defined as “that being, this appears,” but if 
entities are relative they lack real existence and the formula becomes meaning­
less. An entity existing by itself in its own nature retains the state and form 
natural to itself. Being already present it does not depend on other entities. It 
does not come into being. Consequently, something which has a fixed nature of 
its own cannot dependently originate. But as dependent origination is postulated 
this can only apply to entities lacking self-nature which are causally impotent. 
Accordingly pratitya samutpdda is meaningless except in a phenomenal sense.
As causality in the Abhidharma view is not self-becoming but requires the co­
operation of several factors {pratyayas') in producing an effect, the question arises 
as to what it is that makes the various factors which by themselves are discon­
nected entities into relevant causes and conditions? And if some other factor were 
assumed as bringing about this condition, what is it that makes this factor, too, 
a cause? This clearly leads to an infinite regress. This difficulty is peculiar to all 
theories of external causation which take the causes to be several. Buddhism does 
not accept God or other conscious universal co-ordinating agency. In none of 
these four pratyayas can the so-called effect be found. And if it does not exist in 
them, how can it be produced out of them?
While accepting the traditional Brahmanic view of knowledge, as leading to 
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enlightenment, in the sense of clear insight, there is also the tendency in Bud­
dhism to limit positive knowledge to the minimum and put on one side all 
questions irrelevant to gaining liberation from dukkha. This check to theoretical 
speculation is a secret of the vigour and potency of the teaching. The Mad- 
hyamika reinforced this tendency.
The concept of a middle path is applicable to religion in general. Here the one 
extreme is that man can work out his salvation on his own without any help from 
outside, the other that he can achieve nothing by himself. The position taken 
varies with the religion and its particular stage of development. In early Bud­
dhism and the Theravada man is expected to work out his own salvation. It 
may not be possible to find a complete explanation for the swing of the pendulum 
in Buddhism, but the destructive dialectic of Nagarjuna and his school must have 
been influential. The effect of the Sunyavada was to produce an indeterminacy 
into phenomena and their relationship. For “all things have come into being, not 
of themselves and not by another and not without a cause.” Confidence in the 
light of human reason to discover ultimate truth was no doubt shaken by this. 
The pendulum swung almost to the opposite extreme from its original position: 
“Just as a man who is blind from birth cannot see the sun, just so are men in 
the throes of conventional conceptions, they do not perceive the Buddha directly, 
but wish to detail {prapancayanti) him conceptually. Only by them he cannot be 
seen directly (aparoksavartin). Buddha must be regarded as the Cosmic order 
(dharmata), his body is the Cosmos (dbarmata). The essence of the Cosmos is 
incognisable, it is impossible to know what it is conceptually. The reality of the 
Buddha is the reality of the Universe and as far as the Buddha has no separate 
reality (nihsvabhavaf neither has the Universe any apart from him. All the ele­
ments of existence, when sifted through the principle of Relativity (Sunyata), 
become resplendent. All the millions of existences (bhutakoti) must be regarded 
as the Body of the Buddha manifested in them. This is Relativity or Sunyata, 
the Climax of Wisdom QPrajndparamita),^2
2 Buddhist Conception of Nirvana, p. 45.
According to this new point of view liberation cannot be gained by any rational 
system of knowledge, but only by the saving grace of the Tathagata with his 
Triple Body, first to become a Bodhisattva and then a Buddha. The necessity is 
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to serve the Buddha in all beings and all places, and to become devoid of self to 
make room for the Self of selves. This teaching might be summed up as “If I give 
the Buddha all I am, he will give me all he is.”
Ignorance as the motive power behind the process of dependent origination 
acquires a new and concrete sense. It becomes essentially that kind of ignorance 
which hides the highest, completest truth (Sunyata) by its belief that it is ac­
cessible to ordinary knowledge and thought, and by its failure to realise that 
logical deduction (kalpana) represents a falling-away from Sunyata into duality 
and suffering.
It must not be thought that the consistent application of Nagarjuna’s dialectic 
to all concepts, relations and things produces a nihilistic attitude. Rather it 
produces a basic serenity and stability manifesting as a disinterested benevolence 
accompanied by tolerance and forbearance from opinions and judgements. It 
might well be termed “apatheia,”3 a condition free from suffering as being 
no longer subject to self-centred passions.
3 Not the insensibility of the Stoics, but disinterested love—“passionless passion.”
It is not a state of apathy or insensitivity but on the contrary the indescribable 
radiance of Sunya or Prajnaparamita when the clouds of Avidya and Maya are 
swept away.
The Madhyamika is surely deserving of more consideration than it receives at 
the present time, representing as it does the maturity of critical analysis. And 
more than any other system it truly represents a Middle Path.
This one Reality eternal
Has been revealed by the victorious Buddha
The lion of mankind:
It is not born, it does not live,
It does not die, does not decay,
And merged in it are all the beings!
If something has no essence in itself;
How can it then receive an essence from without?
There are therefore no things internal,
. There are also no things external
But everywhere present is our Lord.
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This absolute condition of Quiescence,
Where every individual disappears,
Has been revealed by the real Buddha,
There is in it no individual life whatever,
There you will stroll from birth delivered!
You will then be yourself the Saviour,
And you will save the hosts of living beings!
There is no path discernible whatever,
There you will live from birth delivered,
And free yourself, deliver many beings!
Arya-Ratnakara Sutra 
(Buddhist Conception of Nirvana, p. 180)
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